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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a network
paradigm shift that facilitates comprehensive network pro-
grammability to cope with emerging new technologies such
as cloud computing and big data. SDN facilitates simplified
and centralized network management enabling it to operate in
dynamic scenarios. Further, SDN uses the OpenFlow protocol
for communication between the controller and its switches. The
OpenFlow creates vulnerabilities for network attacks especially
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). DDoS attacks are launched
from the compromised hosts connected to the SDN switches.
In this paper, we introduce a time- and space-efficient solution
for the identification of these compromised hosts. Our solution
consumes less computational resources and space and does not
require any special equipment.
Index Terms—SDN, DDoS attacks, OpenFlow, AMS sketch
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of mobile devices, and the emergence
of new technologies such as the Internet of Things, and
Cloud computing etc., the number of internet devices has
been increased at an unprecedented rate. This has triggered a
significant increase in the growth and complexity of networks
on a large scale which comes with its challenges. The existing
network technologies and infrastructure do not offer a scalable
and easy to manage solution for such large and complex
networks [1].
Software Defined Networking (SDN) [2] stands out as an
important solution among all the other proposed approaches
in terms of coping with the inherent challenges of a complex
and large network. One of the most salient feature of SDN is
division of the data plane and the control plane. The control
plane makes the decisions where to send packets, and the
data plane implements these decisions and actually forwards
the packets. Additionally, optimal network operations can be
achieved by utilizing the benefits of centralization i.e. making
decisions with a complete view of overall network conditions
from a single and centralized point. Though SDN offers
flexibility and efficient management at a low cost, it also
introduces new vulnerabilities [3].
OpenFlow is a standard protocol that is used for com-
munication between switches and central controller in SDN.
Being a relatively new paradigm, OpenFlow still has some
vulnerabilities which can be exploited in many ways that
directly affect the security of the network. OpenFlow deals
with the incoming data packet according to the matching flow
entry in the flow table of the switch. The packet may be
forwarded to the controller for further processing in case of a
table miss in the flow table. This gives room to the attackers to
devise an attack called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack. The malicious attacker can generate a large number of
packets with missing entries in the flow table which are sent to
the central controller by OpenFlow, ultimately exhausting the
central controller and failing the performance of the network.
Many recent studies have identified that the SDN paradigm
is prone to DDoS attacks by malicious users [4] [5]. In this
work, we are focusing on the detection of compromised hosts
(attacker). As a switch may be serving many hosts, it is very
important for DDoS mitigation that compromised hosts should
be detected efficiently (both in terms of time and space).
Our main contributions are the following:
• We developed an accurate method to study the commu-
nication patterns of each host and detect compromised
(attacker/zombie) hosts.
• Our method is efficient in terms of time and space
complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents SDN background, DDoS attack, and problem
formulation. We provide a brief review of existing methods in
Section III. Section IV elaborates our proposed solution and in
Section V we present the experimental setup and results of the
proposed method. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section
VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we discuss the SDN architecture and the
DDoS problem in OpenFlow based SDN. We begin with a
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brief description of SDN fundamentals, proceed to OpenFlow
operation, DDoS attack and its consequences on the network
performance. Finally, problem is formulated for finding an
optimal solution.
A. SDN Architecture
SDN is one of the emerging networking technologies and one
of the most important block in softwarization of communication
networks. Moreover, SDN enables the network to be dynamic,
easy to manage, flexible and scalable to adapt itself according
to the given requirements. For this purpose, SDN separates the
control plane from the data/forwarding plane and concentrate all
the computing capabilities at the centralized controller. As the
controller has an overall picture of the network, a better view
of network bottlenecks, and centralized information processing
capability, it is in a much better position to make a well-
calculated decision considering the whole scenario.
An SDN architecture consists of three layers: the First
layer (application layer) is composed of applications that are
responsible for the management and security of the underlying
network. The second layer (control layer) provides a platform
(centralized controller) for the application layer to control
and manage the underlay infrastructure layer. The centralized
controller act as the brain of network, performing processing
and instructing switches for their operation. SDN controller
can be seen as the operating system of a network, it facilitates
automated network management and simplifies the integration
of new business applications. Finally, the Last layer consists
of physical network entities that are controlled and managed
according to the application specifications and requirements via
the SDN controller. The block diagram of SDN architecture
is given in Figure 1.
B. OpenFlow Protocol
OpenFlow is a Layer 2 protocol and closely associated with
the SDN for communication between different SDN nodes
specifically, the controller and switches. OpenFlow protocol
enables the SDN controller to communicate and instruct
its connected switches on how to deal with different types
of incoming packets. Precisely, the SDN switches work as
forwarding devices following certain rules which are defined by
the controller [6]. An OpenFlow enabled switch may perform
the following functions in the response of incoming packets.
• Identification and categorization of incoming/ingress pack-
ets based on packet header fields.
• Process the packets e.g. packet header modification. In
some cases, the action in a flow entry asks for modification
in the packet header e.g. change time to live, flow priority.
• Drop or forward the packets to a specific outgoing/egress
port or SDN controller.
The instructions transmitted from an SDN Controller to
an SDN switch are defined as flows. Each individual flow
contains different information such as match fields, flow priority,
counters, actions, and flow timeouts, etc. The flows are arranged
in flow tables. A switch should have at least one flow table
but have the option of multiple flows tables for flexibility. If
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Figure 1: SDN Architecture.
the header of an incoming packet matches with a flow table
entry, the action specified for this entry is performed, otherwise
(in case of unique/non-repetitive random header) the packet is
encapsulated in a message (query) and send to the controller
using OpenFlow protocol. In response to a switch query, the
controller processes the header of the given packet and decides
either its path to forward it or drop it. Further, controller instruct
switches about the specified action for any future packets of
this kind.
C. DDoS on SDN Controller
Consequently, the centralization of processing capabilities
of a network introduces the problem of a single point of
failure. In other words, if somehow the SDN controller is
compromised or made unavailable for the switches queries,
the whole network will lose its function. One of the famous
attacks on the centralized controller is DDoS, where a huge
number of packets with non-repetitive headers are injected
from a group of compromised (zombies) hosts into the network
using techniques like spoofing etc. [7] [8]. As these packets
have non-repetitive headers that result in table misses and
packets are forwarded to the controller for processing. Every
controller has a limited processing capacity and this flooding of
unspecified packets increases processing load on it. Eventually,
the load of these packets increases so much that the controller
becomes unavailable for the normal network processing. A
failed controller is the basic aim of DDoS attack as this results
in the loss of SDN architecture [9] [10].
D. Problem Formulation
Let consider a SDN network, consists of a centralized
controller C which manages a set of N switches S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sN}. Further, each switch is providing services
to a set of hosts/clients that are connected to it. For example
switch si is serving a set of hosts Hpi = {hp1, hp2, . . . , hpi}.
Moreover, the controller C with the computation capabilities of
c that represents the amount/number of queries that a controller
can handle at a given time. Similarly, each switches s has
a buffer with capacity k that is the amount of storage to
temporary store non-repetitive packets. Further, each switch
receives incoming traffic represented by Ti, which consists of
repetitive tri and non-repetitive tmi packets (Ti = tri + tmi).
The non-repetitive packets cause table misses and eventually
forwarded to the controller for processing. Therefore, the load
Lc on a centralized controller will be the amount of non-
repetitive packets from all the connected switches and given
as follows
Lc =
N∑
i=1
tmi (1)
Further, a DDoS attack introduces an artificial flood of non-
repetitive packets on the controller [11]. We can represent the
computation capacity of a controller as the capacity to process
the amount of non-repetitive packets per unit time, given as
Cc = xtm, where x is the maximum number of packets that
the controller can process in a unit time. In the given scenario,
we can say that a DDoS attack is successful if the number of
non-repetitive packets in the controller is equal to or greater
than the controller capacity which is given as follows
Cc ≤
N∑
i=1
tmi (2)
where tmi denotes the number of non-repetitive packets at
switch si.
III. RELATED WORK
To cope with the increasing rate of internet devices and
new internet technologies, SDN is considered a vital solution
among all the other existing methods. Its decoupled architecture
allows more flexibility, management, and low cost than the
traditional networks [2].
SDN uses Open Flow as a communication protocol that
maintains all the communication between the switches and the
main controller. Though SDN offers a lot of benefits over the
traditional network, its architecture still needs improvement to
make it more secure. Open Flow also introduces vulnerabilities
in SDN architecture which can attract a DDoS attack [12].
Many studies have been done to detect DDoS attack on
SDN due to vulnerabilities in Open Flow [2] [4] [10] [13]
[14]. Kotani et al. [15] presents a solution to filter out Packet-In
messages to be processed by the centralized controller to save
it from getting overburdened. Their solution suggests applying
restrictions on important and less important messages based on
the value in headers. The switches store the header values of
the packets to be forwarded to the controller for time t. If the
packet with existing header values arrives in t, it does not get
forwarded to the controller in that time window. This solution
does not cater for DDoS attack with non-repetitive random
header patterns. Mousavi et al. [16] introduce the idea of using
entropy to identify the decrease in randomness in the flow of
packets towards controllers and detect an early DDoS attack.
The frequencies for the destination IP addresses are stored for
window size t and entropy is calculated to identify the DDoS
attack when the arrived packet number reaches the window
size.
In [17], a DDoS detection framework for SDN has been
proposed specifically for data centers using bounds on the rate
and duration of the flow defined by analyzing the statistics
collected from flows at switches. If the traffic does not
comply with the defined bounds of legitimate traffic, it initiates
mitigation action.
Wang et al. [5] proposed a two-modules based scheme. The
first module is to detect the anomaly in traffic by monitoring the
traffic flows of switches based on rate features and asymmetric
features. The second module mitigates the DDoS attack by
activating the slave controller which shares the traffic load of
the master controller while the master controller sends messages
to switches to drop the malicious messages based on traffic
analysis results.
Dridi et al. [18] give a solution for DDoS attack in SDN
by dynamically rerouting the malicious traffic, adjusting the
flow timeouts and aggregating the flow rules. Lim et al. [19]
suggest to modifying the model of the controller by setting
up logical queues (separate queues for each switch), and the
controller should serve these logical queues with a scheduling
discipline.
Most of the work that has been done previously in an
attempt to detect and mitigate the problem involves data storage
and analysis which consumes memory, requires complex
computations, and presents the risk of false-positive and false-
negative [20]. This raises the need for an efficient solution that
consumes less memory and provides more assurance.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we present the method for detecting com-
promised hosts. Consider an SDN architecture with a set
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} of N switches and that the switch si ∈ S
serves pi hosts. Let H be the set of all possible unique headers
that a packet can contain.
The defining characteristic of a compromised host is that
a majority of the packets received from it at the serving
switch have unique (non-repetitive) headers. This forces the
switch to seek forwarding instructions from the controller, thus
overwhelming the controller and resulting in a DDoS attack.
Each switch can (in theory) analyze patterns in the packets
coming from each of its hosts and identify an attacking host.
To undertake such an analysis, the switch will require to store
the information about ingress packets of each of its hosts and
determine the number of unique headers and that of repetitive
headers. Formally, let h be a host served by switch si and F
be a |H|-dimensional frequency vector, i.e. F [j] is the number
of packets containing header j within an observation window
(frequency of header j).
The host h can then be pinpointed as a (potentially)
compromised if the majority of the non-zero frequencies in the
vector F are 1’s or small positive numbers. This is so because
if say 490 of the last 500 packets incoming from h are unique,
this will cause an increased load on the controller.
The observation window could be time-based (e.g. the last
few timestamps) or based on traffic volume (e.g. the latest
fixed number of packets). We take the observation window
to be traffic volume-based, i.e. we assume F is the headers
frequency vector of the last M incoming packets from the host,
where M is window size (total number of incoming packets).
Various statistics of the F vector can be used to highlight a
potentially erratic behavior. Let
F0 =
∑
j∈H
(F [i])0 (3)
where 00 := 0. Thus F0 is the number of unique headers used
by a host. As discussed above a high value of F0 for a host is
a clear indication of a host being compromised. For instance,
a host can be declared compromised if F0/M ≥ 80%.
We define F1 and F2 as following
F1 =
∑
j∈H
F [i] (4)
F2 =
∑
j∈H
(F [i])2 (5)
Clearly, F1 = M , as it is just counting the total number
of packets, hence it cannot be used as indicative of the
host being compromised. The number F2, called the second
frequency moment (also called the surprise number or self-join
size) clearly indicates if the host has the characteristics of a
compromised one.
It is easy to see that the variance of the frequencies
σF =
F2
F0
−
(
F1
F0
)2
(6)
Since in an SDN, the switches have very low memory and
operational capacities, the space and computational complexity
of maintaining the F vector (e.g. F0) for each host is prohibitive.
Note that F can be stored as a list of key-value pairs but since
|H| is usually very large, even for small values of M it will
not be practical. Therefore, we cannot directly use F0 nor F2
because of space and computational problems.
To solve the computational and space problem, we use AMS
sketch algorithm [21] to estimate F2 for each host. Using the
sketch for every host, the F2 can be estimated in constant time
per ingress packet and constant overall space.
All switches use a set of d random hash functions from a
4-wise family of universal hash functions.
gi : H → {−1, 1} (7)
Each switch uses these d hash functions and maintains d
integer variables (Xh1 , X
h
2 , . . . , X
h
d ) for each host h. On arrival
of ingress packets from the host h, it extracts the header hdr
from the packet and process as given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for estimating F2
P ← ingress packet from host h
hdr ← EXTRACTHEADER(P )
for i = 1 to d do
Xhi ← Xhi + gi(hdr)
After processing of the M th packet from host h, it returns
the estimate for the value of F2 for host h as follows
F
′
2 := MEAN (X
2
1 , X
2
2 , . . . , X
2
d) (8)
Equation (8) returns the average value of the squares of the
d values saved for the host h. We use following results from
[21] to argue that F
′
2 is a very close estimate of F2.
Lemma 4.1: For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, E[X2i ] = F2
Using the fact that the hash functions are from a 4-wise
universal family of hash functions, we get the following bound
on the variance in the estimate.
Lemma 4.2: For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, VAR(X2i ) ≤ 2F2
Combining Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 we get the following
results.
Theorem 4.3: If d = 22δ , then
• Pr[|F ′2 − F2| > F2] ≤ δ.
• Processing time per packet is constant (see Algorithm 1).
• The space requirement is O( 12δ ) = O(1).
After approximating the F2 (and respective integer variable
X) for d hash functions, we set a threshold τ to differentiate
the zombie hosts from the good ones. If Xhi ≤ τ , then we
declare that host h as the zombie host and vice versa. The
threshold value τ is taken +/- 5 from the actual value of total
number of packets. This is so because we believe that the
zombie host tends to request more unique headers (out of the
total number of packets) as compared to the normal host. After
categorizing each host as zombie or good, we compute true-
positive and true-negative values by comparing our predicted
hosts categories with actual ones.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe the details of implementation and
the hyperparameters list which we used for experiments. All
results are computed by taking an average of 50 runs. Our code
is implemented in Matlab on a Core i7 PC with 8GB memory,
and 500GB storage. We report true-positive and true-negative
values (for detecting the attackers and good hosts) as goodness
measure.
First, we characterize the hosts as good/zombie hosts. A host
is a Good host if it requests the destination addresses which
are repeated multiple times (not mostly unique addresses). On
the other hand, zombie host requests unique addresses most of
the times, which cause DDoS attack. To detect an abnormal
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Figure 2: True-Positive and True-Negative values for increasing value of τ using M as (a) 50, (b) 100, and (c) 150 respectively.
activity from a host h, we set a threshold τ . If the approximate
value for a host h is less than τ , it means that the host is a
zombie and vice versa. We assume that each host can request to
a single switch only and there are unique set of hosts connected
to different switches. Each host can send a specific number
of requests to the switch. Since we are approximating F2,
therefore we use several hash functions and take the mean of
these approximations to compute as accurate results as possible.
We fix the number of attackers that are randomly selected from
a pool of hosts.
A. Hyperparameters
Our proposed method uses several hyperparameters (as dis-
cussed above) whose values combination effect the performance
of our approach. Hyperparameters values yielding maximum
performance are given in Table I.
Hyperparameters Values
No. of Hosts 30
No. of Hash Functions d 4
No. of Switches N 5
No. of Headers |H| 5000
No. of Attackers 4
No. of Packets M 50,100,150
Threshold τ 1:10
Table I: Hyperparameters values.
B. Results and Discussion
Results in Figure 2 show the true-positive and true-negative
values for the increasing value of τ by setting M as (a) 50,
(b) 100, and (c) 150 respectively.
We observe that the value of τ has not much effect on
true-positive values if its value is taken almost same as the
number of packets. This behavior shows that out of those total
number of packets, if a host requests predominantly unique
packets (headers), we assume that the host is not doing a
normal operation. The same behavior is observed in case of
true-negative (with just a few up/down spikes). The spikes
in case of true-negative are because of the fact that in some
cases, zombie host can try to act as normal host by varying
its behavior. We tried to capture this effect also (by generating
less unique requests) which sometimes cause the true-negative
value to drop. However, adjusting the value of τ can eliminate
this effect which is evident from Figure 2. If we further reduce
the value of τ , it means that we are giving more chances to
zombie hosts to appear as normal hosts by slightly modifying
their request pattern. On the other hand, if we increase the τ ,
it means that we are forcing some of the normal hosts in the
category of the zombie hosts which will reduce the efficiency of
our system. Hence selecting the accurate value of τ is critical.
Results in Figure 3 show the effect of changing number of
hash functions d on true-positive and true-negative values. We
can see that there are some up/down spikes but the overall
trend does not change with the increasing value of d.
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Figure 3: Effect of increasing d on True-Positive and True-
Negative values.
Figure 4 shows the effect of increasing value of d on the
runtime. We can see in Figure 4 that the runtime almost linearly
increase as we increase the number of hash functions. Therefore,
the value of d should be low.
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Figure 4: Effect of increasing d on Runtime.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a time- and space-efficient solution
to detect the DDoS attack on SDN. Most of the previously
proposed methods require a large amount of data storage which
is difficult to manage in case of memory limited devices. Our
methodology distinguishes the attackers from the legitimate
hosts by processing a stream of packet headers on the fly
without consuming large space for data storage and processing.
The conducted experiments prove the efficiency of our solution
with a significantly good true-positive and true-negative rate.
We also demonstrate that with an accurate value of τ , we can
achieve more accuracy in detecting the malicious attackers.
One possible future extensions of this work is to investigate
the better threshold values τ in comparison with the number
of hosts.
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